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  on	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  Policy	  and	  the	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This	  essay	  is	  an	  introduction	  to	  a	  forthcoming	  special	  issue	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  
Consumer	  Policy,	  on	  Behavioural	  Economics,	  Environmental	  Policy	  and	  the	  
Consumer.	  It	  emphasizes	  that	  consumer	  behavior	  can	  be	  greatly	  affected	  by	  the	  
context,	  which	  may	  make	  it	  easy	  or	  difficult	  for	  people	  to	  make	  choices	  that	  
benefit	  or	  harm	  the	  environment,	  and	  which	  may	  make	  environmentally	  
relevant	  features	  of	  products	  more	  or	  less	  salient.	  Open	  questions,	  both	  ethical	  
and	  empirical,	  are	  identified.	  The	  essays	  in	  the	  symposium,	  summarized	  here,	  
offer	  both	  positive	  and	  more	  critical	  accounts	  of	  behaviourally	  informed	  
regulation	  and	  its	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  hands-­‐on	  applications	  of	  
behavioural	  findings	  to	  environmentally	  relevant	  consumer	  behaviour.	  
	  	   In	  the	  midst	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  United	  States	  military	  saw	  a	  large	  number	  	  of	  “wheels’	  up”	  crashes,	  which	  occur	  when	  pilots	  retract	  the	  wheels	  rather	  than	  the	  flaps.	  The	  sheer	  number	  of	  crashes	  appeared	  to	  raise	  a	  psychological	  question:	  Why	  were	  American	  pilots	  so	  careless?	  To	  answer	  that	  question,	  the	  authorities	  enlisted	  a	  psychologist,	  Lieutenant	  Alphonse	  Chapanis,	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  was	  causing	  the	  problem	  (Mullainathan	  and	  Shafir	  2013).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Professor,	  Copenhagen	  Business	  School,	  Department	  of	  Intercultural	  Communication	  and	  Management.	  **	  Robert	  Walmsley	  University	  Professor,	  Harvard	  University.	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   Chapanis	  quickly	  learned	  that	  the	  mistakes	  were	  being	  made	  by	  bomber	  pilots,	  flying	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  planes,	  and	  not	  by	  transport	  pilots.	  But	  that	  finding	  raised	  more	  questions:	  What	  was	  wrong	  with	  the	  bomber	  pilots?	  Were	  they	  under	  some	  kind	  of	  stress?	  Were	  they	  tired?	  Poorly	  trained?	  Poorly	  chosen?	  Champanis’	  answer	  came	  from	  investigating	  not	  pilot	  psychology,	  but	  the	  bombers’	  cockpits.	  In	  the	  bombers,	  the	  wheel	  controls	  and	  the	  flap	  controls	  were	  right	  next	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  they	  looked	  identical.	  In	  the	  transport	  planes,	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  controls	  looked	  very	  different.	  Chapanis’	  solution?	  He	  put	  a	  rubber	  wheel	  on	  the	  landing	  wheel	  lever	  so	  that	  pilots	  would	  not	  get	  confused	  about	  which	  lever	  to	  pull	  (ibid.).	  	  	   In	  thinking	  about	  social	  problems	  and	  human	  behaviour,	  economists	  typically	  focus	  on	  incentives.	  If	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  reduce	  consumption	  of	  a	  product,	  the	  standard	  economic	  prescription	  is	  to	  raise	  its	  price.	  But	  the	  pilots	  had	  strong	  incentives,	  and	  the	  right	  ones.	  They	  did	  not	  want	  to	  crash	  their	  planes	  (and	  risk	  their	  lives).	  The	  underlying	  problem	  involved	  not	  incentives	  but	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  cockpit	  (ibid.).	  What	  pilots	  chose	  was	  a	  product	  of	  that	  architecture.	  When	  the	  wheel	  controls	  and	  the	  flap	  controls	  were	  difficult	  to	  differentiate,	  pilots	  made	  a	  large	  number	  of	  serious	  mistakes.	  	  	   Behavioural	  scientists	  have	  spent	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  studying	  people’s	  mistakes.	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  last	  forty	  years	  of	  behavioural	  science	  might	  be	  described	  as	  the	  systematic	  study	  of	  human	  error	  (Thaler	  1994).	  We	  know,	  for	  example,	  that	  people	  use	  certain	  heuristics	  in	  evaluating	  risks,	  and	  that	  these	  heuristics	  lead	  to	  blunders	  (Kahneman	  2011);	  that	  people	  procrastinate	  and	  are	  prone	  to	  inertia;	  that	  people	  are	  especially	  averse	  to	  losses	  (ibid.);	  that	  they	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  framing	  effects;	  that	  people	  can	  suffer	  from	  both	  “present	  bias,”	  focusing	  unduly	  on	  the	  short-­‐term,	  and	  unrealistic	  optimism,	  leading	  them	  to	  fail	  to	  take	  precautions;	  and	  that	  people	  do	  not	  see	  certain	  aspects	  of	  products	  and	  activities	  because	  those	  aspects	  are	  “shrouded,”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  neither	  salient	  nor	  highly	  visible.	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  much	  more	  (ibid.).	  All	  of	  these	  findings	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have	  important	  implications	  for	  environmental	  protection	  and	  the	  general	  idea	  of	  sustainability.	  	  	   Recently,	  however,	  behavioural	  scientists,	  behavioural	  economists,	  and	  behaviourally	  informed	  policy	  analysts	  have	  placed	  less	  emphasis	  on	  human	  error,	  and	  much	  more	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  human	  behaviour	  and	  the	  social	  background—on	  analogues	  to	  the	  cockpit	  (Mullainathan	  and	  Shafir	  2013).	  When	  the	  wheel	  controls	  and	  the	  flap	  controls	  were	  close	  together	  and	  essentially	  identical,	  pilots	  were	  effectively	  nudged	  to	  err.	  Consumers	  operate	  in	  their	  own	  sorts	  of	  cockpits.	  If	  a	  grocery	  store	  puts	  unhealthy	  foods	  next	  to	  healthy	  ones	  and	  makes	  them	  look	  identical,	  many	  consumers	  will	  buy	  unhealthy	  foods	  by	  mistake.	  And	  if	  consumers	  cannot	  distinguish	  between	  energy-­‐efficient	  products	  and	  energy-­‐inefficient	  alternatives,	  they	  will	  err	  as	  well.	  They	  will	  err	  even	  more	  if	  energy-­‐efficient	  products	  are	  hard	  to	  find,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  understand	  the	  economic	  and	  environmental	  benefits	  of	  energy-­‐efficient	  products.	  	  	  	   Attention	  to	  the	  cockpit,	  or	  to	  choice	  architecture,	  opens	  up	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  options	  for	  policy	  design.	  For	  example,	  default	  rules	  can	  have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  consumer	  behaviour	  (Sunstein	  and	  Reisch	  2014),	  and	  choice	  architects	  have	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  tools	  by	  which	  to	  influence	  decisions	  (Johnson	  et	  al.	  2012).	  In	  the	  environmental	  domain,	  as	  elsewhere,	  default	  rules	  tend	  to	  be	  particularly	  powerful.	  But	  it	  would	  also	  be	  possible,	  for	  example,	  to	  emphasize	  social	  norms	  (Allcott	  and	  Rogers	  2012);	  to	  provide	  purely	  factual	  information	  (Loewenstein	  et	  al.	  2014);	  to	  offer	  warnings;	  to	  frame	  options	  in	  particular	  ways	  (Willis	  2013);	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  certain	  items	  appear	  first	  or	  last	  (Hanks	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Dayan	  and	  Bar-­‐Hillel	  2011;	  Wansink	  2004);	  to	  require	  active	  choosing,	  perhaps	  on	  a	  frequent	  basis	  (Rebonato	  2012);	  to	  provide	  the	  equivalent	  of	  “maps;”	  to	  offer	  frequent	  reminders;	  and	  to	  make	  certain	  variables	  or	  product	  characteristics	  highly	  salient.	  	  	  	   The	  repertoire	  of	  choice-­‐preserving	  interventions,	  or	  “nudges,”	  is	  constantly	  expanding.	  Such	  approaches	  are	  receiving	  attention	  not	  only	  from	  the	  private	  sector	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but	  also	  from	  governments	  all	  over	  the	  world;	  not	  least	  because	  they	  offer	  the	  hope,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  the	  promise,	  of	  effective	  reforms	  that	  do	  not	  impose	  significant	  costs	  on	  consumers	  or	  taxpayers.	  As	  the	  articles	  in	  this	  issue	  suggest,1	  default	  rules	  can	  serve	  as	  especially	  important	  reforms.	  As	  the	  articles	  also	  suggest,	  a	  great	  deal	  remains	  to	  be	  done.	  We	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  work	  along	  two	  quite	  different	  tracks.	  The	  first	  involves	  ethical	  issues;	  the	  second	  involves	  empirical	  questions.	  	  	  	   In	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  idea	  of	  paternalism	  is	  not	  especially	  appealing,	  though	  of	  course	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  among	  nations	  on	  this	  count	  (a	  point	  to	  which	  we	  will	  return).	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  ask:	  When,	  exactly,	  is	  it	  legitimate	  for	  a	  government	  to	  affect	  consumer	  behaviour?	  One	  possible	  answer,	  associated	  with	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  is	  that	  if	  consumers	  are	  not	  harming	  others,	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  make	  their	  own	  choices,	  and	  should	  not	  even	  be	  “nudged”	  (Glaeser	  2006).	  Even	  if	  we	  accept	  this	  answer,	  we	  might	  insist	  that	  there	  is	  considerable	  room	  for	  behaviourally	  informed	  approaches	  whenever	  consumer	  choices	  affect	  other	  people—as	  they	  typically	  do	  when	  environmental	  issues	  are	  involved	  (Sunstein	  and	  Reisch	  2014).	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  democratic	  government	  is	  concerned	  about	  air	  pollution,	  including	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases.	  In	  such	  cases,	  mandates	  have	  a	  legitimate	  place,	  as	  do	  economic	  incentives,	  but	  nonprice	  interventions,	  including	  behaviourally	  informed	  strategies,	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  (Allcott	  and	  Mullainathan	  2010).	  Indeed,	  behaviourally	  informed	  approaches	  might	  be	  even	  more	  effective,	  and	  even	  more	  cost-­‐effective	  (ibid.).	  	  	   We	  might	  also	  wonder	  about	  the	  claim	  that	  behaviourally	  informed	  approaches	  are	  illegitimate	  even	  when	  harm	  to	  others	  is	  not	  involved.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  fuel	  economy	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  rules	  could	  save	  consumers	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  money,	  and	  that	  consumers	  do	  not	  make	  ideal	  choices	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  their	  own	  welfare	  (Bubb	  and	  Pildes	  2014).	  If	  we	  prize	  consumer	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Some	  of	  them	  are	  preliminarily	  available	  at	  http://link.springer.com/journal/10603/onlineFirst/page/1	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sovereignty,	  we	  might	  wonder	  how	  this	  could	  be	  so,	  but	  consumers	  might	  be	  mistaken	  about	  the	  kinds	  of	  choices	  that	  are	  best	  for	  them	  (cf.	  Kahneman	  2011),	  and	  in	  any	  case	  their	  cockpits	  are	  sometimes	  poorly	  designed.	  	  	  	   If	  so,	  mandates	  might	  themselves	  be	  justified	  on	  welfare	  grounds	  (Bubb	  and	  Pildes	  2013;	  Conly	  2013).	  It	  follows	  that	  even	  welfare	  is	  the	  master	  concept,	  some	  behaviourally	  informed	  approaches	  might	  legitimately	  take	  the	  form	  of	  mandates	  or	  bans.	  The	  argument	  for	  nudges	  is	  stronger	  still,	  because	  they	  allow	  consumers	  to	  go	  their	  own	  way	  (Sunstein	  and	  Reisch	  2014).	  In	  some	  respects,	  they	  operate	  like	  a	  GPS,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  provide	  guidance	  that	  consumers	  can	  follow	  if	  they	  wish	  (Thaler	  and	  Tucker	  2013).	  To	  this	  point	  it	  might	  be	  added	  that	  some	  forms	  of	  nudging	  are	  essentially	  inevitable	  even	  if	  we	  have	  not	  acknowledged	  them.	  No	  cockpit	  lacks	  a	  design,	  and	  consumers	  are	  inevitably	  making	  choices	  against	  a	  background	  that	  nudges	  them	  in	  certain	  directions.	  In	  our	  view,	  this	  point	  can	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  decisive	  objection	  to	  those	  who	  reject	  nudging	  as	  such.	  	  	   Having	  said	  that,	  we	  should	  agree	  that	  hard	  questions	  are	  easy	  to	  imagine,	  raising	  serious	  ethical	  issues	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  both	  welfare	  and	  autonomy.	  When	  should	  consumers	  be	  asked	  to	  make	  active	  choices?	  When	  are	  defaults	  preferable	  to	  active	  choosing?	  When	  is	  purely	  factual	  information	  better	  than	  a	  default	  (or	  some	  other	  kind	  of	  nudge)?	  What	  are	  the	  limits	  on	  the	  use	  of	  social	  norms?	  When	  does	  nudging	  become	  manipulation?	  These	  questions	  receive	  attention	  in	  this	  issue—and	  they	  will	  deserve	  far	  more	  attention	  in	  the	  future.	  One	  way	  to	  make	  progress	  would	  be	  to	  focus	  directly	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  decisions	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  errors.	  If	  a	  particular	  approach	  would	  minimize	  the	  sum	  of	  those	  two	  sets	  of	  costs,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  argument	  on	  its	  behalf.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  certain	  default	  rule	  would	  reduce	  the	  costs	  of	  decisions	  and	  also	  lead	  to	  results	  that	  are	  highly	  desirable	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  consumers	  themselves.	  If	  so,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  argument	  for	  that	  default	  rule.	  We	  do	  not	  contend	  that	  an	  inquiry	  into	  decision	  costs	  and	  error	  costs	  exhausts	  the	  ethical	  questions,	  but	  it	  does	  provide	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helpful	  orientation,	  and	  perhaps	  it	  can	  help	  make	  some	  apparently	  intractable	  (and	  abstract)	  disputes	  more	  tractable	  (and	  less	  abstract).	  	  	   The	  empirical	  questions	  are	  at	  least	  equally	  pressing.	  Indeed,	  some	  of	  the	  ethical	  questions	  can	  and	  should	  be	  studied	  in	  empirical	  terms,	  by	  asking	  about	  people’s	  considered	  judgments	  about	  those	  questions	  (Felsen	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Loewenstein	  et	  al.	  2014).	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  behaviourally	  informed	  interventions,	  social	  scientists	  and	  policymakers	  have	  learned	  a	  great	  deal	  over	  the	  last	  decades,	  especially	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  randomized	  control	  trials	  (Banerjee	  and	  Duflo	  2011).	  Even	  with	  these	  advances,	  we	  believe	  that	  our	  understanding	  remains	  in	  its	  adolescence,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  in	  childhood.	  	  	   When,	  for	  example,	  do	  disclosure	  policies	  actually	  affect	  consumers?	  On	  that	  question,	  the	  most	  substantial	  questions	  are	  unanswered,	  with	  some	  evidence	  that	  at	  least	  in	  some	  contexts,	  consumers	  are	  often	  not	  much	  affected,	  but	  that	  producers	  do	  alter	  their	  offerings	  (Loewenstein	  et	  al.	  2014).	  To	  what	  extent	  are	  consumers	  affected	  by	  environmental	  considerations,	  or	  by	  other	  factors	  that	  do	  not	  involve	  economic	  self-­‐interest?	  With	  respect	  to	  savings	  behaviour,	  automatic	  enrollment	  has	  had	  an	  extremely	  significant	  impact,	  indeed	  a	  larger	  impact	  than	  substantial	  tax	  incentives	  (Chetty	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Are	  there	  analogues	  for	  the	  environment?	  With	  respect	  to	  climate	  change	  in	  particular,	  exactly	  how	  much	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  improved	  architecture?	  When	  are	  mandates	  or	  incentives	  necessary	  or	  preferable	  (Conly	  2012)?	  How	  can	  developing	  nations	  use	  behavioural	  findings	  to	  obtain	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  economic	  and	  environmental	  variables?	  And	  what	  kinds	  of	  cultural	  differences	  can	  we	  find	  on	  the	  empirical	  questions?	  Do	  different	  nations,	  and	  different	  ethnic	  groups,	  react	  differently	  to	  behaviourally	  informed	  interventions?	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  and	  respond	  to	  heterogeneity?	  	  	   The	  articles	  in	  this	  issue	  cast	  light	  on	  many	  of	  these	  questions.	  Our	  hope	  is	  that	  they	  might	  contribute	  to	  an	  improved	  design	  of	  the	  countless	  cockpits	  of	  modern	  societies.	  The	  seven	  papers	  offer	  both	  positive	  and	  more	  critical	  accounts	  of	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behaviourally	  informed	  regulation	  and	  its	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  hands-­‐on	  applications	  of	  behavioural	  findings	  to	  environmentally	  relevant	  consumer	  behaviour.	  Reflecting	  the	  different	  disciplines	  that	  are	  crucial	  to	  thoroughly	  developing	  and	  promoting	  research	  in	  the	  field	  of	  behavioural	  economics,	  policy,	  and	  law,	  our	  authors	  come	  from	  diverse	  disciplines	  such	  as	  environmental	  psychology,	  economic	  psychology,	  experimental	  economics,	  resource	  economics,	  decision	  sciences,	  and	  public	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  applied	  mathematics	  and	  consumer	  law.	  	  	  	  In	  Informing	  versus	  Nudging	  in	  Environmental	  Policy,	  Folke	  Ölander,	  the	  late	  Founding	  Editor	  of	  this	  journal	  and	  his	  successor	  John	  Thøgersen	  from	  Denmark’s’	  Aarhus	  University	  compare	  “nudging”	  as	  a	  tool	  in	  environmental	  policy	  with	  the	  classical	  approach	  of	  providing	  consumers	  with	  information.	  (Information	  provision	  can,	  of	  course,	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  nudge.)	  While	  acknowledging	  that	  information	  has	  not	  been	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  very	  successful	  means	  of	  promoting	  voluntary	  behaviour	  change	  to	  protect	  the	  environment,	  and	  while	  finding	  significant	  effects	  from	  nudges,	  they	  are	  also	  critical	  of	  recommendations	  from	  behavioural	  economics,	  which	  focus	  on	  making	  the	  choice	  architecture	  more	  facilitating	  for	  the	  desired	  behaviour.	  The	  authors	  present	  three	  studies	  demonstrating	  how	  mental	  shortcuts,	  based	  on	  subtle	  cues	  in	  the	  context,	  unconsciously	  influence	  human	  decision-­‐making,	  with	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  environment.	  Two	  of	  their	  own	  studies	  illustrate	  the	  behavioural	  impacts	  of	  anchoring	  (the	  design	  of	  the	  European	  energy	  label)	  and	  default	  effects	  (the	  framing	  of	  a	  request	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Smart	  Grid).	  Moreover,	  they	  use	  data	  from	  a	  study	  by	  Göckeritz	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  to	  illustrate	  the	  impacts	  of	  herding	  or	  descriptive	  norms	  (the	  social	  context	  of	  energy	  saving).	  While	  acknowledging	  these	  effects,	  Ölander	  and	  Thøgersen	  point	  to	  what	  they	  see	  as	  theoretical	  weaknesses	  in	  behavioural	  economics	  and	  call	  for	  research	  into	  strengthening	  the	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  behaviour	  change.	  	  
Riccardo	  Rebonato,	  a	  lecturer	  at	  the	  Mathematics	  Institute	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Oxford,	  sets	  out	  a	  more	  general	  Critical	  Assessment	  of	  Libertarian	  Paternalism.	  In	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particular,	  he	  assesses	  to	  what	  extent	  libertarian	  paternalism	  lives	  up	  to	  its	  libertarian	  credentials,	  and	  whether	  this	  “softer”	  version	  of	  paternalism	  is	  more	  or	  less	  desirable	  than	  the	  traditional,	  more	  coercive—but	  as	  he	  claims,	  also	  more	  transparent—form.	  Rebonato’s	  key	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  effective	  and	  nominal	  ability	  to	  reverse	  a	  nudge	  is	  more	  important	  than	  its	  theoretical	  ease	  of	  reversibility—the	  more	  so,	  if	  anchoring,	  framing,	  and	  status	  quo	  bias	  are	  as	  powerful	  as	  the	  libertarian	  paternalists	  maintain.	  If	  the	  libertarian	  paternalistic	  nudges	  are	  effective,	  but	  not	  always	  transparent,	  Rebonato	  argues	  that	  this	  effectiveness	  raises	  some	  (not	  yet	  adequately	  addressed)	  questions,	  namely:	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  interventions;	  about	  how	  the	  true	  preferences	  of	  the	  consumer	  can	  be	  ascertained	  by	  the	  choice	  architect	  and	  the	  role	  played	  by	  rationality	  in	  this	  process;	  and	  about	  the	  effective	  respect	  of	  her	  autonomy.	  Finally,	  he	  highlights	  some	  alternatives	  to	  “nudging”	  which	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  full	  process	  of	  choice,	  rather	  than	  on	  its	  outcomes.	  These	  approaches,	  he	  claims,	  could	  better	  preserve	  true	  autonomy	  of	  choice.	  	  The	  following	  four	  articles	  use	  theory	  and	  empirical	  insights	  from	  psychology	  and	  behavioural	  economics,	  and	  investigate	  whether	  applying	  them	  can	  initiate	  consumer	  behaviour	  change	  towards	  more	  environmentally	  friendly	  solutions.	  In	  their	  article	  Aiding	  Decision	  Making	  to	  Reduce	  the	  Impacts	  of	  Climate	  Change,	  Wharton	  School’s	  Howard	  Kunreuther	  and	  Columbia	  University	  based	  Elke	  U.	  Weber	  examine	  individuals’	  cognitive	  and	  motivational	  barriers	  to	  adopting	  climate	  change	  adaptation	  and	  mitigation	  measures	  that	  increase	  consumer	  welfare.	  They	  explore	  various	  strategies	  that	  take	  into	  account	  the	  simplified	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  used	  by	  individuals	  and	  resulting	  biases.	  The	  authors	  make	  these	  points	  by	  working	  through	  two	  examples:	  firstly,	  investments	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  products	  and	  new	  technology	  and	  secondly,	  adaptation	  measures	  to	  reduce	  property	  damage	  from	  future	  floods	  and	  hurricanes.	  In	  both	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  reluctance	  to	  undertake	  these	  measures	  due	  to	  high	  and	  certain	  upfront	  costs,	  delayed	  and	  probabilistic	  benefits,	  and	  behavioural	  biases	  related	  to	  this	  asymmetry.	  Their	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  use	  of	  choice	  architecture	  through	  framing	  and	  the	  use	  of	  default	  options	  coupled	  with	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short-­‐term	  incentives	  and	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  can	  encourage	  greater	  investment	  in	  these	  measures.	  	  Energy	  conservation	  results	  in	  environmental	  (reduced	  emissions)	  and	  financial	  (reduced	  costs)	  savings.	  Consumers’	  perception	  of	  the	  worthiness	  of	  changes	  in	  behaviour	  may	  differ	  depending	  on	  whether	  environmental	  or	  financial	  savings	  are	  emphasized.	  In	  Making	  Small	  Numbers	  Count:	  Environmental	  and	  
Financial	  Feedback	  in	  Promoting	  Eco-­‐driving	  Behaviours,	  a	  French-­‐Dutch	  research	  team,	  Ebru	  Dogan,	  Jan	  Willem	  Bolderdijk	  and	  Linda	  Steg,	  investigates	  the	  effects	  of	  using	  either	  environmental	  or	  financial	  feedback	  in	  the	  context	  of	  eco-­‐driving.	  In	  their	  study,	  participants	  evaluated	  six	  scenarios	  describing	  different	  eco-­‐driving	  behaviours.	  Participants	  in	  experimental	  groups	  were	  informed	  about	  either	  the	  environmental	  or	  financial	  savings	  realized	  by	  adopting	  the	  behaviours.	  A	  control	  group	  did	  not	  receive	  information	  on	  possible	  savings.	  Results	  indicated	  that,	  unlike	  commonly	  assumed,	  environmental	  savings	  are	  considered	  more	  worthwhile	  than	  commensurate	  financial	  savings	  (at	  least	  within	  this	  population).	  Yet,	  intentions	  to	  adopt	  eco-­‐driving	  behaviours	  were	  mainly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  feedback	  per	  
se,	  rather	  than	  the	  content	  of	  feedback.	  The	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  implications	  of	  these	  findings	  should	  be	  further	  discussed.	  	  Avoiding	  waste	  of	  all	  kinds	  has	  become	  a	  key	  strategy	  of	  environmentally	  sound	  consumption.	  One	  widely	  spread	  kind	  of	  waste	  is	  junk	  mail	  that	  burdens	  consumers	  everywhere.	  Attaching	  “No	  junk	  mail!”	  stickers	  to	  mailboxes—in	  most	  countries	  legally	  enforceable—offers	  a	  simple	  solution	  for	  protecting	  against	  unwanted	  paper	  ads.	  Georg	  Liebig	  and	  Jens	  Rommel	  from	  Humboldt	  University	  in	  Berlin	  presume	  that	  the	  use	  of	  such	  stickers	  can	  be	  increased	  if	  consumers	  deliberately	  decide	  either	  for	  or	  against	  receiving	  junk	  mail.	  In	  Active	  and	  Forced	  
Choice	  for	  Overcoming	  Status	  Quo	  Bias:	  A	  Field	  Experiment	  on	  the	  Adoption	  of	  “No	  
junk	  mail”	  Stickers	  in	  Berlin,	  Germany,	  they	  put	  this	  conjecture	  of	  status	  quo	  bias	  on	  the	  test	  bed	  and	  report	  on	  a	  field	  experiment	  run	  with	  more	  than	  900	  households.	  In	  one	  treatment,	  stickers	  were	  put	  into	  mailboxes,	  facilitating	  active	  choice;	  in	  a	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second	  treatment,	  stickers	  were	  attached	  halfway	  onto	  the	  outsides	  of	  mailboxes,	  forcing	  consumers	  to	  either	  remove	  or	  fully	  attach	  them.	  They	  found	  that	  roughly	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  sample	  attached	  a	  sticker	  after	  treatment.	  With	  an	  uptake	  of	  more	  than	  21,	  as	  compared	  to	  16	  percent,	  the	  forced	  choice	  was	  more	  effective	  than	  the	  active	  choice	  treatment.	  The	  authors	  conclude	  that	  their	  findings	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  green	  nudges	  and	  defaults	  for	  promoting	  pro-­‐environmental	  behaviour,	  suggesting	  policy	  implications	  for	  the	  handling	  of	  such	  matters	  by	  landlords	  and	  housing	  companies.	  	  A	  research	  team	  from	  Georgia	  State	  University	  led	  by	  Paul	  J.	  Ferraro	  and	  
Michael	  Price	  sets	  out	  to	  investigate	  the	  difficult—and	  often	  untouched—question	  of	  longer-­‐term	  impacts	  of	  behavioural	  nudges	  to	  achieve	  public	  policy	  objectives.	  In	  
The	  Persistent	  Impacts	  of	  Norm-­‐Based	  Messaging	  and	  Their	  Implications	  for	  Water	  
Conservation	  they	  report	  on	  a	  randomized	  experimental	  design	  with	  over	  100,000	  households	  in	  which	  they	  study	  the	  longer-­‐term	  impacts	  of	  a	  one-­‐time	  behavioural	  nudge	  that	  aims	  to	  induce	  voluntary	  reductions	  in	  water	  use	  during	  a	  drought.	  Combining	  technical	  information,	  moral	  suasion,	  and	  social	  comparisons,	  the	  nudge	  has	  a	  surprisingly	  persistent	  effect.	  Although	  its	  effect	  size	  declines	  by	  almost	  50%	  after	  one	  year,	  it	  remains	  detectable	  and	  policy-­‐relevant	  even	  six	  years	  later.	  Further	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  intervention	  works	  through	  both	  short-­‐lived	  behavioural	  adjustments	  and	  longer-­‐lived	  adjustments	  to	  habits	  or	  physical	  capital.	  Treatment	  effects	  are	  not	  detectable	  in	  homes	  from	  which	  the	  treated	  consumers	  have	  moved,	  which	  provides	  suggestive	  evidence	  that	  these	  longer-­‐lived	  adjustments	  are	  mobile	  rather	  than	  incorporated	  into	  the	  housing	  stock.	  Also,	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  effect	  makes	  the	  intervention	  more	  cost-­‐effective	  than	  previously	  assumed	  (cost	  drops	  by	  almost	  60%).	  Nevertheless,	  water	  utilities	  may	  find	  this	  persistence	  undesirable	  if	  the	  nudges	  are	  intended	  to	  have	  only	  a	  short-­‐run	  effect	  on	  demand	  during	  environmental	  emergencies.	  	  The	  final	  contribution	  of	  this	  special	  issue	  comes	  from	  an	  author	  with	  a	  background	  in	  law.	  Kai	  Purnhagen	  from	  the	  Dutch	  University	  of	  Wageningen	  focuses	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on	  the	  precautionary	  principle,	  a	  key	  approach	  of	  European	  regulation.	  In	  The	  
Behavioural	  Law	  and	  Economics	  of	  the	  Precautionary	  Principle	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  Its	  
Impact	  on	  Internal	  Market	  Regulation,	  Purnhagen	  argues	  that	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  contributes	  to	  “the	  social	  aspect”	  of	  internal	  market	  regulation	  as	  it	  counterbalances	  the	  loss	  aversion	  and	  availability	  bias	  of	  regulators	  who	  may	  too	  hastily	  endorse	  measures	  based	  on	  furthering	  fundamental	  freedoms	  instead	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  environmental	  protection.	  According	  to	  the	  author,	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  also	  enhances	  the	  regulatory	  power	  of	  the	  European	  Union:	  By	  way	  of	  regulating	  via	  the	  precautionary	  principle,	  EU	  institutions	  pretend	  to	  have	  answers	  to	  citizens’	  fears.	  These	  fears	  result	  from	  a	  crisis	  of	  causality,	  as	  society	  is	  trying	  to	  find	  a	  meaning	  to	  what	  sometimes	  appears	  as	  a	  series	  of	  patternless	  events.	  In	  essence,	  Purnhagen	  claims	  that	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  takes	  advantage	  of	  these	  effects	  and	  creates	  an	  image	  of	  being	  able	  to	  cope	  with	  these	  fears—but	  also	  that	  it	  may	  be	  questioned	  whether	  the	  legal	  order	  is	  living	  up	  to	  these	  expectations.	  	  We	  are	  hopeful	  that	  the	  various	  essays	  might	  contribute	  to	  both	  theory	  and	  practice	  in	  these	  important	  domains.	  We	  are	  most	  grateful	  to	  our	  supportive	  reviewers,	  who	  have	  contributed	  in	  reviewing	  about	  two	  dozen	  submissions	  for	  this	  special	  issue.	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